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Th e Use of Covid-19 Digital Applications and Unavoidable 
Th reats to the Protection of Health Data and Privacy1
Abstract: Th is paper starts with a dilemma. How to ensure the adequate protection of individual health 
data and privacy in a global pandemic, which has intensifi ed the use of digital applications for the 
purposes of data sharing and contact-tracing? Th ere is no simple answer to this question when choosing 
between the protection of public health and individual privacy. However, the history of the existing 
case-law regarding infectious diseases control, both Polish and European, teaches about numerous 
examples in which health data and privacy were not adequately protected, but, on the contrary, were 
misused leading to human rights infringements. In light of this case law and public health ethics, this 
paper argues radically that the use of digital applications to fi ght the Covid-19 pandemic has not been 
suffi  ciently justifi ed at least in the Polish context. Especially, unconvincing benefi ts from the use of these 
1 Th is research was in part supported by the project THEMIS (2018–2021; Principal Investigator: 
Patrycja Dąbrowska-Kłosińska) of the EU Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under 
the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 746014, which is hereby acknowledged.
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tools do not outweigh the likelihood of human rights infringements with far-reaching consequences 
for political, social and economic rights now and in the future. In its novelty, this article combines 
a historical-legal method with the concept of public health ethics and a human rights-based approach 
and to foster further research and discussion. Th e text also responds to the pressing need to analyze 
those human rights issues embedded in the Polish reality.
Keywords: COVID-19, digital applications, European Court of Human Rights, fundamental rights, 
global health threats, health data protection, privacy, surveillance
Introduction
Th e Covid-19 pandemic has drawn urgent attention to the known legal and 
ethical dilemma of how to ensure the adequate protection of individual privacy in 
times of “mass surveillance” technologies and global health threats of infectious 
diseases which require data sharing and contact-tracing.2 Answers to this dilemma 
and the practical feasibility of ensuring an adequate level of protection in case of 
sensitive health data, particularly prone to infringements and misuse, have been 
challenged by the development of modern technologies of big data algorithms and 
artifi cial intelligence3. Th ese issues have already been highlighted by scholars in 
surveillance and security, human and constitutional rights and public health law 
studies4.
Yet, shortly aft er the coronavirus outbreak, many governments began 
employing digital tools, especially individual mobile phone applications (so-called: 
2 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Th e right to privacy in the 
digital age, 3.8.2018, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DigitalAge/Pages/ReportDigitalAge.aspx 
(accessed 28.04.2021), pp. 5–8ff . See also for example: N. Ram, D. Gray, Mass surveillance in the 
age of COVID-19, ‘Journal of Law and the Biosciences’ 2020, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 1–17 and the sources 
provided there. 
3 S.L.  Roberts, Big Data, Algorithmic Governmentality and the Regulation of Pandemic Risk, 
“European Journal of Risk Regulation” 2019, vol. 10, Issue 1, pp. 94–115; cf. W.K.  Mariner, 
Reconsidering Constitutional Protection for Health Information Privacy, ‘Journal of 
Constitutional Law’ 2016, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 975–1054, in the U.S. context.
4 In the Polish scholarship, see e.g. K. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz, M. Nowikowska, Bezpieczeństwo, 
tożsamość, prywatność – aspekty prawne, Warsaw 2020; K.  Łakomiec, Konstytucyjna 
ochrona prywatności. Dane dotyczące zdrowia, Warsaw 2020; K.  Świtała, Interoperacyjność 
i bezpieczeństwo danych medycznych w systemach e-zdrowia i telemedycynie, (in:) I. Lipowicz, 
M. Świerczyński and G. Szpor (eds.), Telemedycyna i e-Zdrowie. Prawo i informatyka, Warsaw 
2019; M.  Rojszczak, Ochrona prywatności w cyberprzestrzeni z uwzględnieniem zagrożeń 
wynikających z nowych technik przetwarzania informacji, Warsaw 2019; P. Dąbrowska-Kłosińska 
Stosowanie unijnych przepisów o transgranicznych zagrożeniach dla zdrowia, a ochrona danych 
osobowych w UE, „Przegląd Prawa i Administracji Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis” 2016, vol. 
107, pp. 53–81; A. Grzelak, Ochrona danych osobowych we współpracy państw członkowskich 
UE w zwalczaniu przestępczości, Warsaw 2015; W.R.  Wiewiórowski, Profi lowanie osób 
na podstawie ogólnodostępnych danych, (in:) A. Mednis (ed.), Prywatność a ekonomia: ochrona 
danych osobowych w obrocie gospodarczym, Warsaw 2013.
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“Apps”), to fi ght the pandemic by controlling the way people move, collecting 
information about infected people and people with whom the infected had contact, 
and serving as communication tools. Consequently, a pressing need has emerged 
to re-examine the use of these applications for public health protection in the 
context of individual privacy. Specifi cally, crucial questions concern the purposes 
which these digital applications or systems really serve and their eff ectiveness; their 
possible violation of individual privacy in the public dimension while protecting 
the collective right to health; the justifi cation of limiting the right to privacy 
especially in light of the proportionality analysis; and, fi nally, the implications for 
other human rights. 
Th e development and use of digital tools caused the world-wide reaction of 
various actors and stakeholders. To begin with, the response by policy authorities 
and civil society shall be mentioned. A considerable number of documents was 
issued by the international organizations concerned with the use of these tools, data 
transfers and human rights protection in the context of fi ghting the pandemic: EU 
institutions5, the Council of Europe6 and the OECD7. Both civil society and private 
actors also published reports to emphasize the complexity of the issue8. 
5 See e.g. European Commission, Communication from the Commission Guidance on Apps 
supporting the fi ght against COVID 19 pandemic in relation to data protection, 2020/C 124 
I/01, C/2020/2523 (O.J.  C 124I, 17.4.2020), pp. 1–9; European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS), EU Digital Solidarity: a call for a pan-European approach against the pandemic, 
6.4.2020, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/fi les/publication/2020–04-06_eu_digital_solidarity_
covid19_en.pdf (accessed 28.4.2021); Joined statement on the right to data protection in the 
context of the COVID-19 pandemic by A.  Pierucci and J.-P.  Walter, 30.3.2020 https://rm.coe.
int/covid19-joint-statement/16809e09f4 (accessed 28.4.2021); European Data Protection 
Board (EDPB), Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contact tracing tools in the 
context of the COVID-19 outbreak, 21.4.2020, https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/fi les/fi les/fi le1/
edpb_guidelines_20200420_contact_tracing_covid_with_annex_en.pdf (accessed 28.4.2021); 
Fundamental Rights Agency (later: FRA), Coronavirus Pandemic in the EU – fundamental rights 
implications: with a focus on contact-tracing apps, https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/fi les/fra_
uploads/fra-2020-coronavirus-pandemic-eu-bulletin-may_en.pdf (accessed 28.4.2021). 
6 Protection of health-related data – Recommendation CM/Rec(2019)2 adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 27.3.2019.
7 OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), Ensuring data privacy as 
we battle COVID-19, 14.4.2020 http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/ensuring-
data-privacy-as-we-battle-covid-19–36c2f31e/#section-d1e690 (accessed 28.4.2021).
8 Privacy leaders, https://iapp.org/resources/article/privacy-leaders-views-impact-of-covid19-
on-privacy-priorities-practices-programs/ (accessed 28.4.2021); Deloitte Report, Privacy and 
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Next, the state of the art in the scholarship needs to be outlined. Th e 
problematique has been extensively explored by the academia9. Th e debate has 
been inter-disciplinary and thematically and territorially wide-ranging. Th e ethical 
analyses have mushroomed, including those which off er guidelines to be respected 
by policy-makers10. Th e legal studies examine the protection of health data 
privacy in times of Covid-19 contact-tracing generally11 and digital applications 
specifi cally12, and they warn of threats from authoritarian regimes not aligning 
to the rule of law13. Several common threads can be identifi ed in these analyses, 
namely: (i) they investigate whether and how the protection of ethical principles 
and human rights can be ensured when using digital tools/applications to fi ght the 
pandemic; (ii) they scrutinize the existing guarantees of the right to privacy and 
data protection provided by the present European legal system and/or the scope of 
lawful limitations of those rights; and (iii) they generally accept that the protection 
of public health may justify the use of digital tools. Further, to understand the 
limitations of the right to data protection, this scholarship usually refers to the 
digital environment case law and/or to security threats-related case law14, neither 
of which is directly health-related, which may imply diff erent protection standards. 
In other words, while fearing possible infringements, the majority of legal studies 
focus on de lege lata and de lege ferenda arguments using the method of deduction 
to infer opinions about the present (the Covid-19 applications and the relevant 
9 M.  Kędzior, Th e right to data protection and the COVID-19 pandemic: the European 
approach, „ERA Forum” 2021, no. 21, pp. 533–543; W.R. Wiewiórowski, Rola Unii Europejskiej 
w koordynacji zastosowania narzędzi informatycznych do walki z pandemią, „Europejski 
Przegląd Sądowy” 2020, no. 6, pp. 20–33.
10 C. Pagliari, Th e ethics and value of contact tracing apps: International insights and implications for 
Scotland’s COVID-19 response, “Journal of Global Health” 2020, vol. 10; F. Lucivero, N. Hallowell, 
S. Johnson , B. Prainsack, G. Samuel and T. Sharon, COVID-19 and Contact Tracing Apps: Ethical 
Challenges for a Social Experiment on a Global Scale, “Journal of Bioethical Inquiry” 2020, no. 17, 
pp. 835–839.
11 H.  van Kolfschooten, A.  de Ruijter, COVID-19 and privacy in the European Union: A legal 
perspective on contact tracing, “Contemporary Security Policy” 2020, vol. 41, Issue 3, pp. 478–491.
12 See A. Michałowicz, Stosowanie aplikacji mobilnych podczas pandemii COVID-19 z perspektywy 
ochrony danych osobowych, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2020, no. 6, pp. 34–42; L. Bradford, 
M.  Aboy and K.  Liddell K., COVID-19 contact tracing apps: a stress test for privacy, the 
GDPR, and data protection regimes, “Journal of Law and the Biosciences” 2020, vol. 7, no. 1, 
pp. 1–33; P.H. O’Neill, T. Ryan-Mosley and B. Johnson, A fl ood of coronavirus apps are tracking 
us. Now it’s time to keep track of them, “MIT Technology Review”, 7 May 2020, https://www.
technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittr-covid-tracing-tracker (accessed 
28.4.2021).
13 M.  Rojszczak Nieograniczone programy inwigilacji elektronicznej a koncepcja państwa 
autorytarnego, „Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis - Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem” 
 2020, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 207–243.
14 Ibidem; H. van Kolfschooten, A. de Ruijter, COVID-19, op.cit.
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legal and practical framework) and make recommendations for the future (about 
their potential safe use). 
We appreciate the importance of the above-mentioned studies. However, this 
article takes a diff erent point of departure. In its novelty, it combines a historical-legal 
method with the concept of public health ethics and a human rights-based approach 
to argue that digital applications likely cause human rights infringements and that 
legal guarantees are oft en disregarded. 
First, methodologically, we refer to the past to understand the present and off er 
some lessons for the future. We thus employ the historical-legal method to trace past 
violations and unconstitutionalities in the context of health data protection case-law 
where infectious diseases were at issue. We use the examples of judicial decisions that 
established protection standards to show that unconvincing benefi ts from the use 
of digital applications for public health protection do not outweigh the likelihood 
of rights violations with far reaching consequences. By doing so, we follow the 
approaches that advocate the inquiries about the past in legal analyses of the health 
and human rights fi eld15. Th e human and constitutional rights framework applicable 
in Poland off ers the normative orientation for the text (the Polish Constitution, the 
EU Charter for Fundamental Rights “CFR”, and the European Convention for Human 
Rights “ECHR”).
Second, we take the concepts of George Annas and Wendy Mariner on the need 
for application of public health ethics to control government actions in health. Th ey 
admit that it is hard “to defi ne a set of ethical principles unique to public health”, and 
they claim to link human and constitutional rights, health law and (medical) ethics to 
implement values such as equality, justice and non-discrimination16. Th ey emphasize 
that “public health is a social endeavor”17 and thus must be assessed within social and 
democratic institutions where governments are obliged to respect, protect and fulfi l 
human rights, which means adhering to the rule of law more generally. Th ey highlight 
that the methods of reaching public health goals as such can be ethically controversial 
(and not the aim as such) and claim that governments should show (burden of proof) 
that their public health policy is justifi able and necessary. 
Th ird, we accept that the right to health data protection may need to be lawfully 
limited to implement contact-tracing procedures and infectious diseases control 
measures to fi ght the pandemic. However, we question the justifi cation of limitations, 
15 G.J. Annas, Worst Case Bioethics, Oxford/New York 2011; T. Murphy, Health and Human Rights’ 
Past: Patinating Law’s Contribution, “Health and Human Rights Journal” 21 November 2019. Cf. 
also P. Alston, Does the past matter? On the origins of human rights, “Harvard Law Review” 2013, 
vol. 126, no. 7, pp. 2043–2081.
16 See G.J.  Annas and W.  K.  Mariner, (Public) Health and Human Rights in Practice, “Journal 
of Health Politics, Policy and Law” 2016, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 129–133 for the explanation of the 
possible conceptualisation of public health ethics.
17 Ibidem, p. 130.
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including their proportionality in case of digital tools, while looking at the seriousness 
of possible immediate consequences for human rights, including political, social 
and economic rights, and the rule of law. We also argue that the value of protecting 
health privacy should be prioritized in pandemics, because the chronic emergency 
situations may encourage loosening the basic principles of data protection, which in 
turn may lead to the abuse of these data.
Finally, the above method, frames and approach allow us to argue radically 
that there has not been sufficient justification for the use of individual mobile 
phones digital applications for contact-tracing and quarantine control to fight the 
Covid-19 pandemic, at least, currently, in Poland. To present the argument, the 
text proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the digital applications used in Poland 
during the Covid-19 pandemic; section 3 presents the past case-law regarding the 
health data protection and privacy, its limitations and infringements; and section 
4 contains an appraisal in light of public health ethics. The last section offers 
conclusions.
1. Th e Polish Covid-19 Applications and Privacy Th reats 
in Comparative Perspective
A wide variety of applications have been in use during the Covid-19 pandemic, 
which can be divided broadly in three types: 1) contact–tracing applications that 
make users aware of the interaction with the virus; 2) self-assessment applications 
that inform users about Covid-19 risks, symptoms and steps to follow when they 
emerge; and 3) quarantine-enforcement applications that report on quarantined 
people. Th e following sections present analytically the applications used in Poland 
to combat Covid-19 against the comparative background of other European states to 
highlight doubts around their design, mode of use and legal framework constituting 
threats to privacy rights18.
1.1. Th e contact-tracing application: ProteGO Safe
From a public health perspective, the contact-tracing applications seem most 
promising to help governments manage the spread of diseases and complement 
traditional, in-person, contact-tracing. Th ey are designed to inform users of their 
contact with a person who tested positive for Covid-19 and to upload data on the 
phone, aft er which the system sends a notifi cation to phones of those who have been 
18 See also: Th eme 3: Covid-19, privacy rights and cyber security risks, “Covid-19 Resources”, 
Pinciples for Responsible Investment, 7.9.2020, https://www.unpri.org/covid-19-resources/
theme-3-covid-19-privacy-rights-and-cyber-security-risks/6343.article (accessed 28.4.2021).
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in close contact with the person19. Th e applications rely on various technologies to 
track and store users’ locations: either Bluetooth- (proximity data) or network- and/
or GPS-based20. Bluetooth-based contact-tracing applications are more common; 
individuals download an application that detects other smartphones’ Bluetooth 
signals. Th ese applications follow “a decentralized model” (with users’ data produced 
and stored locally on their devices), which better protects personal data as compared 
to “centralized models” (where users’ data are stored and processed on some central 
servers).
“Trace Together” was one of the fi rst contact-tracing applications introduced 
in the world (Singapore)21. In the EU, the applications were either available 
(Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Spain, and Poland) or under 
development by the end of April 2020 in most states (including Belgium, Germany or 
Denmark)22. As analyzed by the Fundamental Rights Agency (“FRA”), the majority 
of these applications were Bluetooth-based and relied on “a decentralized approach” 
following the recommendations of the European Commission and the European 
Data Protection Board23.
Th e Polish Ministry of Digital Aff airs designed an application called STOP 
COVID –ProteGO Safe24. It was developed to track the location and health data 
of users, disseminate personalized guidance in case of contact with an infected 
person, transmit relevant information directly to the Chief Sanitary Inspector (data 
controller) and provide users with verifi ed medical advice. Th e risk-assessment was 
supplemented with a self-diagnostic monitoring tool and a dedicated helpline25. 
Th e ProteGO thus combined contact-tracing and self-assessment (see below). Th e 
application used Bluetooth-based technology to record data on the proximity to other 
users with the application installed on their devices. As the use of the application was 
19 For technical details see: E. Kusat Kaya, Safety and privacy in the time of covid-19: contact tracing 
applications, Centre of Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
resrep26089?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents (accessed 28.4.2021).
20 Cf. Norwegian Infection Stop, 20 April 2020, Privacy International, https://privacyinternational.
org/long-read/3675/theres-app-coronavirus-apps (accessed 28.4.2021).
21 In line with: eHealth Network, Mobile applications to support contact tracing in the EU’s fi ght 
against COVID-19, Common EU Toolbox for Member States, 15.4.2020, p. 9, https://ec.europa.
eu/health/sites/health/fi les/ehealth/docs/covid-19_apps_en.pdf (accessed 28.4.2021). 
22 FRA, Coronavirus pandemic, op. cit., pp. 52–53.
23 EDPB, Guidelines 04/2020, op. cit.
24 Personal data is processed on the basis of Art. 6, Sec. 1, letters c) and e) GDPR in connection 
with the performance of a task in the public interest, resulting from Art. 1, 2, 3, 6 and 81, Sec. 1, 
4 and 5 of the Act of 14 March 1985 on the State Sanitary Inspection (consolidated text Journal 
of Laws 2019, item 59). See Regulation (EU) No. 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (O.J. L 
119, 4.5.2016), p. 1 (“GDPR”).
25 eHealth Network, Mobile, op. cit., p. 10.
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voluntary, only 1.9% of the Polish population downloaded the application between 
June-September 2020. Th at was one of the lowest take-up levels in Europe, which 
aff ected the eff ectiveness of the costly system26. ProteGO Safe was also criticized for 
fl aws in privacy protection and functionality27.
Following the claims that the system was not eff ective, the Ministry held 
a consultation with the number of the Polish non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), appointed a ProteGO Safe expert team, and fi nally prepared and published 
a set of documents: a privacy policy, a risk analysis for personal data protection, 
a FAQ document and a security audit report. As a result, the NGOs’ evaluation of the 
application was positive, in principle, regarding data protection safety and compliance 
with the principles of applications’ good design28. Th e application neither monitors 
the location nor collects any redundant data; it ensures encryption of transmitted 
messages (keys) and anonymity, and it guarantees data security. 
Notwithstanding these measures, the doubt about the possibility of health data 
misuse remains regarding the practical use of the application. We will return to the 
analysis of the measures in section 4 below.
1.2. Self-assessment applications
Th e second type of developed applications serves information providing 
and gathering purposes. People wishing to know more about Covid-19, possible 
treatment and their health can assess either prognoses about the likelihood of 
infection or information about the outbreak. Th ey allow users voluntarily to upload 
their anonymized data and symptoms to help governments to map the spread of the 
disease. While these applications typically neither ask for individual, identifi able data 
nor transfer them to third parties, some of the applications still do. 
Th ese tools preceded the pandemic and were off ered by private companies 
before29. However, during the pandemic, state governments became involved 
in using them. Th e health reporting applications and websites exist in many EU 
states30; likewise, the World Health Organization has been involved in developing an 
26 B. Koschalka, Uptake of Covid contact tracing app under 2% in Poland, among the lowest rates 
in Europe, 11.9.2020, Notes from Poland, https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/09/11/uptake-of-
covid-contact-tracing-app-under-2-in-poland-among-the-lowest-rates-in-europe/ (accessed 
28.4.2021).
27 See: Coronavirus contact tracing reignites Polish privacy debate, ‘Deutsche Welle’, https://www.
dw.com/en/coronavirus-contact-tracing-reignites-polish-privacy-debate/a-53600913 (accessed 
28.4.2021).
28 A. Obem, ProteGO Safe: instalować czy nie?, 3.8.2020, https://panoptykon.org/czy-instalowac-
protego-safe and links on this webpage (accessed 28.4.2021).
29 See for example in Canada: https://preworkscreen.com/ (accessed 28.4.2021).
30 Coronavirus Pandemic In Th e EU – Fundamental Rights Implications: With A Focus On Contact-
Tracing Apps, 21 March – 30 April 2020, https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/fi les/fra_uploads/fra-
2020-coronavirus-pandemic-eu-bulletin-may_en.pdf, p. 53 (accessed 28.4.2021). 
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application that provides medically-approved information and advice to users based 
on their symptoms31. In some countries, the contact-tracing and self-assessment 
applications are developed together as a one integrated system (e.g., the ProteGO 
Safe).
1.3. Th e Kwarantanna domowa application
Th e third type of Covid-19 applications is comprised of tools that track people 
in quarantine to control their compliance with isolation orders. Th ese applications 
are required to be used by visitors and travelers in some states32, while in others33, 
they have been used by public authorities to communicate Covid-19 information and 
quarantine guidelines and to prevent violations of self-quarantine orders.
Similarly, in Poland, the application Kwarantanna domowa (in English: “home 
quarantine”) was introduced for the individuals subjected to mandatory house 
quarantine, aft er possible Covid-19 exposure, to control whether they respected 
the quarantine orders34. Th e application uses geo-location and face recognition 
technology and obliges concerned individuals to upload their location and photo for 
identity verifi cation upon request by the police. Th e application collects the following 
data: citizen ID – technical identifi er of the citizen, fi rst name, surname, phone 
number, declared residence address, photo, location of the citizen and the end date of 
quarantine. Compliance is mandatory unless one declares: (i) non-subscription/non-
use of the telecommunications network; (ii) non-possession of an adequate mobile 
device to install the soft ware; or (iii) a visual impairment (blind or partially sighted)35. 
Th e Kwarantanna domowa raised concerns about the possible violation of 
users’ rights to personal data protection. Th ese concerns were raised by both public 
institutions and academia. First, the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights (“the 
Polish CHR”) asked the President of the Offi  ce for Personal Data Protection and 
the Prime Minister for an opinion on the matter36. Th ese governmental authorities 
31 See: COVID-19 App, https://worldhealthorganization.github.io/app/ (accessed 28.4.2021).
32 E.g. Russia and Hong Kong, see: Th ere’s an app for that: Coronavirus apps, 20.4.2020, https://
privacyinternational.org/long-read/3675/theres-app-coronavirus-apps (accessed 28.4.2021).
33 Tracking and tracing COVID: Protecting privacy and data while using apps and biometrics, 
23.4.2020, https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/tracking-and-tracing-covid-
protecting-privacy-and-data-while-using-apps-and-biometrics-8f394636/ (accessed 23.4.2020) 
(Th e South Korean Self-quarantine Safety App).
34 J.  Van Zeben and B.A.  Kamphorst, Tracking and Nudging through Smartphone Apps: Public 
Health and Decisional Privacy in a European Health Union, “European Journal of Risk 
Regulation” 2020, vol. 11, Issue 4, p. 838.
35 Art. 7e of the Act of 2 March 2020 on special solutions related to the prevention, counteraction 
and combating of COVID-19, other infectious diseases and the crisis situations caused by them 
(consolidated text Journal of Laws 2020, item 1842).
36 Aplikacja „Kwarantanna domowa” budzi wątpliwości obywateli. Rzecznik pisze do premiera, 
13.11.2020, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-do-premiera-aplikacja-kwarantanna-domowa-
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obviously declared that appropriate encryption methods had been used and that 
the data processing model complied with the requirements set out in the General 
Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”)37. Second, two specifi c allegations against the 
application’s solutions from the perspective of data protection were enumerated in the 
scholarship38: (i) for unknown reasons, the data stored on centralized servers will be 
kept for 6 years, except for theoretically deleted images when the user deactivates the 
account, if a user does so; (ii) for unknown purposes, the number of actors granted 
access by law to the data processed in the application and the system is unjustifi ably 
large, including the Police Forces Headquarters, the Provincial Police Headquarters, 
the voivodes (the governmental organs of regional administration), e-Health Center, 
the National Research Institute, as well as the third parties: companies Take Task 
S.A.  and Tide Soft ware Sp. z o.o. (entities that support the technical side of the 
application).
Before proceeding to a further assessment, the objective of the next section is to 
show the breadth of possible implications for individual human and constitutional 
rights of the health data access by public and private actors, including for legitimate 
purposes, and to claim that the sensitivity of the data and oft en the fear of disease 
both create an additional temptation for the misuse.
2. Th e Infringements of the Right to Health Data Protection and 
Privacy: Lessons from the European and Polish Case-law Histories
To begin with, several matters merit explanation. 
First, we follow the approach of the courts, both the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal (pre-2015, “CT”) and the EU Court of Justice (“CJEU”) and refer to both 
rights together: the right to respect for private (and family) life and the right to the 
protection of personal data39. Both rights are closely related, protect similar values 
(the autonomy and human dignity of individuals) and are quintessential for the 
exercise of other fundamental freedoms. Second, we treat the normative framework 
applicable to the protection of individual rights, within which the relevant case-
law has developed, as a joint matrix of the Polish (the Constitution and laws) and 
European provisions (CFR and ECHR) with the GDPR (a directly applicable EU 
secondary law) as a key reference for data protection in the EU. Th ird, the subsequent 
budzi-watpliwosci (accessed 28.4.2021). 
37 MC zapewnia: aplikacja mobilna „Kwarantanna Domowa” zgodna z wymogami RODO, 
30.11.2020, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/mc-zapewnia-rpo-aplikacja-kwarantanna-
domowa-zgodna-z-rodo (accessed 28.4.2021).
38 A. Michałowicz, Stosowanie, op. cit., pp. 34–42.
39 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 18 December 2014, K 33/13, OTK-A 2014, no. 11, 
item 120, point 4.4; Judgment of the CJEU of 9 November 2010 on joined cases of Volker and 
Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, C-92/09 and C-93/09, point 52.
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sections depict the lessons from known infringements of the right to health privacy 
through the lens of case-law histories in judicial proceedings in both Polish and 
European courts. Th e text does not aspire to present a systematic history of the 
jurisprudence on judicial standards for personal health data protection. Th e cases 
were purposefully selected to show health data misuse in various contexts important 
for persons’ lives: work environment, judicial proceedings, media and international 
mobility. Specifi cally, we wish to show how particularly damaging health data misuse 
can be for individuals concerned and their human rights in the social and economic 
context notwithstanding the extensive legal guarantees to ensure the protection 
of individual health data privacy and its value. Th is connects to the initial ethical 
dilemma of this text and the known history of human rights violations in the name 
of public interests, including public health (understood broadly). Lastly, the fi rst part 
of the section explains the normative framework for the lawful limitation of health 
privacy rights.
2.1. Th e right to health data protection and privacy and their limitations
Th e following norms apply to possible limitations of the right to health privacy.
Th e Polish Constitution protects both the right to health privacy (Art. 47) and the 
right to the protection of health data (Art. 51)40. Th ese rights can be lawfully limited in 
accordance with Art. 31(3) of the Constitution, which requires compliance with basic 
conditions of legality and proportionality sensu largo. Th at is, the restriction must 
be: (i) based on law; (ii) necessary in a democratic state for one of the enumerated 
purposes; and (iii) respectful of the core of rights, i.e., proportionality sensu stricto41. 
Th e public health is among the legitimate reasons for limitation, and it corresponds 
to the state obligation to prevent and combat epidemic diseases provided by Article 
68 of the Constitution42.
Further, the Constitution does not defi ne “health data” explicitly43, but a broad 
defi nition is included in the GDPR (Art. 4, point 15), which also states that personal 
“data concerning health” belong to the category of sensitive data the processing of 
which is prohibited generally unless specifi c exceptions apply (Art. 9(1) “special 
40 Judgment of the Constitutional Court in the already mentioned case K 33/13 and of 19 February 
2002 in case U 3/01.
41 P. Tuleja, Komentarz do art. 31 Konstytucji RP, (in:) P. Tuleja (ed.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej. Komentarz, Warsaw 2020, p. 114–119; L.  Garlicki and M.  Zubik (eds.), Konstytucja 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Tom I, Warsaw 2016; M.  Safj an and L.  Bosek (eds.), 
Konstytucja RP. Tom I. Komentarz do art. 1–86, Warsaw 2016.
42 T.  Sroka, Ograniczenia praw i wolności konstytucyjnych oraz praw pacjenta w związku 
z wystąpieniem zagrożenia epidemicznego, ‘Palestra’ 2020, no. 6, pp. 75–98 and sources cited 
therein.
43 M. Florczak-Wątor, Komentarz do art. 51 Konstytucji, (in:) P. Tuleja (ed.), Konstytucja, op. cit., pp. 
178–179. See also generally M. Safj an and L. Bosek (eds.), Instytucje Prawa Medycznego. System 
Prawa Medycznego. Tom 1, Warsaw 2017.
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category of data” and Article 9(2)(a-j) “exceptions”)44. Th e relevant exceptions may, 
for example, concern an explicit consent of a person (a); or processing required for 
“establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims” (f); “for reasons of substantial 
public interest” (g); “the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the 
assessment of the working capacity of the employee (…)” provided it is undertaken by 
professionals obliged to professional secrecy (h); “for reasons of public interest in the 
area of public health”, for example, protecting against serious cross-border threats to 
health (i); and scientifi c and historical research and statistical purposes (j)45. Further 
conditions, including limitations, with regard to the processing of health data can be 
introduced by national law.
Certainly, the GDPR enumerated exceptions to health privacy need to be situated 
and interpreted against the national law systems. In Poland, for example, health data 
confi dentiality is further regulated and protected through various acts. Accordingly, 
it can also be limited, for example, pursuant to the applicable health laws (in case of 
patients)46 or civil and criminal judicial procedures’ laws (in case of participants in 
proceedings)47.
Further, we can relate the GDPR general prohibition of sensitive data processing 
to Article 51(2) of the Constitution, which establishes a prohibition of the Polish 
citizens’ data processing by public authorities unless necessary in a democratic 
society. Th is requirement functions similarly to the proportionality principle, which 
brings us back to the point that the constitutionality/lawfulness of a health privacy 
limitation on the basis of any given exception will still need to meet the conditions 
of Article 31(3) of the Constitution (see above)48, and, if the matter falls within the 
scope of the EU law, the CFR.
44 FRA and Council for Europe, Handbook on European Data Protection Law, Luxembourg 2018, 
pp. 42–45; and P. Dąbrowska-Kłosińska, Tracing Individuals under the EU Regime on Serious, 
Cross-border Health Th reats: An Appraisal of the System of Personal Data Protection, “European 
Journal of Risk Regulation” 2017, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 707–710.
45 E.g., Commission Implementing Decision amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/253 as 
regards alerts triggered by serious cross-border threats to health and for the contact tracing of 
passengers identifi ed through Passenger Locator Forms, 25.03.2021, no ref. yet.
46 E.g., M.  Wałachowska, Ochrona danych osobowych w prawie cywilnym i medycznym, Toruń 
2008; M. Jackowski, Ochrona danych medycznych, Warsaw 2011.
47 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
off ences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (O.J. L 119, 4.5.2016). See also A. Grzelak 
(ed.), Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych przetwarzanych w związku z zapobieganiem 
i zwalczaniem przestępczości, Warsaw 2019.
48 M. Florczak-Wątor, Komentarz, op.cit., p. 179.
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Accordingly, Articles 7 and 8 of the CFR constitute right to privacy and data 
protection respectively in the EU, and a lawful limitation of the rights needs to respect 
Article 52(1) CFR, including in the context of public health49. Consequently, every 
transfer of health information by a public authority may be justifi ed only if: (i) it is “in 
accordance with the law”; (ii) it pursues an objective which is exhaustively listed; and 
(iii) it is “strictly necessary” and proportional to achieve that objective50. In addition, 
since the CJEU makes direct references to the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(“ECtHR”) privacy case-law while considering data protection issues, the limitations 
which may lawfully be imposed on the right to protection of health privacy in the EU 
correspond to those accepted under Article 8 ECHR (the right to respect for private 
and family life)51, which also stems from Article 52(3) CFR52.
To put it simply, every judicial review of a possible rights’ violation will need to 
establish: (i) the occurrence of interference with health privacy either with or without 
justifi cation (i.e., adequate legal basis, legitimate aim/exception); and (ii) the necessity 
and proportionality of the applicable exception to health data processing prohibition 
(e.g., public health surveillance, serious health threat, etc.). In the context of a given 
claim in question, the scope and content of judicial review will depend on a court 
considering which specifi c legal framework will be applied as a source of human 
rights protection (that is, whether it shall be a constitutional or ECtHR standard). 
Th e court will also decide on a primary point of departure for the interpretation and 
construction of the standard of review for its ruling, including, e.g., a proportionality 
assessment. 
Let us now turn to the relevant judicial practice.
49 Cf. also Judgment of CJEU of 8 April 2014 on joined cases of Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger 
and Others, C-293/12 and C-594/12, point 238.
50 Cf. Judgment of CJEU of 20 May 2003 on joined cases of Österreichischer Rundfunk, C-465/00, 
C-138/01 and C-139/01, points 73–75. See also Judgment of CJEU of 16 December 2008 on the 
case of Huber v. Germany, C-524/06, point 68.
51 See also Judgment of ECtHR of 29 April 2014 on the case of L.H.  v. Latvia, application no. 
52019/07; Judgment of ECtHR of 16 February 2000 on the case of Amann v. Switzerland, 
application no. 27798/95; Judgment of ECtHR of 4 May 2000 on the case of Rotaru v. Romania, 
application no. 28341/95.
52 Judgment of CJEU of 9 October 2009 on joined cases of Volker and Markus Schecke, C-92/09 and 
C-93/09, points 51–52, 57, 89. See also P. De Hert and S. Gutwirth, Data Protection in the Case 
Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: Constitutionalisation in Action, (in:) S. Gutwirth, Y. Poullet, 
P. De Hert, C. de Terwangne and S. Nouwt (eds.), Reinventing Data Protection?, Dordrecht 2009, 
p. 3.
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2.2. Lesson 1: Th e health data disclosure without consent and freedom 
of expression 
Th e opening example comes from the ECtHR and concerns press publication of 
personal health data without consent and its questionable justifi cation through the 
protection of the freedom of expression and public interest53.
In January 2001, Lithuania’s biggest daily newspaper published a front-page 
article about the exposure of residents in villages of remote Lithuania to fear of death 
and the AIDS threat54. Th e text provided the name, private life extensive details and 
the health status (seropositive and tuberculosis) of Ms. Biriuk. Th e accuracy of the 
information was confi rmed by the medical staff  of a local hospital. National courts 
found the breach of her privacy, but the damages awarded were derisory. Moreover, 
the Lithuanian Supreme Court indicated that the personal safety of people living in 
proximity to those sick with AIDS and dangers from persons whose behavior does 
not always meet moral standards need to be taken into account as valid arguments55.
Th e ECtHR did not agree that “the purported concerns of the local population 
for their safety were legitimate, either socially or scientifi cally” and did not justify 
a publication about the applicant’s state of health and her life style. It established 
a violation of Article 8 ECHR and raised damages awarded to the applicant. Further, 
the ECtHR emphasized the fact that medical staff ’s confi rmation of the published 
health data particularly undermined societal trust in the medical profession, and 
observed that lack of patient confi dentiality, especially in case of infectious diseases, 
aff ects negatively the willingness of people to HIV-test voluntarily and seek appropriate 
treatment. Th e disclosures of health data endanger both individuals concerned and 
the society at large. Th e ECtHR also indicated that the state obligation to safeguard 
medical privacy must be eff ective and that the allegations about someone’s health and 
personal life cannot be justifi ed by a legitimate public interest and facts-reporting 
necessary for a debate in a democratic society (Article 10 freedom of expression). Th e 
Court explained that disclosure of health data may dramatically aff ect an individual’s 
private and family life, as well as the individual’s social and employment situation56.
Th is case is illustrative for several reasons. Th e societal fear of disease pressures 
public authorities, including the judiciary, to accept the publication of health data of 
potentially “dangerous individuals”, especially in cases of infectious diseases for the 
sake of the alleged protection of “public safety interest”. As a result, those authorities 
oft en follow a paternalistic path, and their behavior leads to stigmatization and 
53 Judgment of CJEU of 6 November 2003 on the case of Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01.
54 Judgment of ECtHR of 25 November 2008 on the case of Biriuk v. Lithuania, application no. 
23373/03 and Judgment of ECtHR of 25 November 2008 on the case of Armonienė v. Lithuania, 
application no. 36919/02.
55 ECtHR case Biriuk v. Lithuania, op. cit., points 1–10.
56 Ibidem, points 34–47.
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shaming of individuals, which adversely aff ects their social lives considerably. 
Further, it prompts them and others similarly situated to hide their health condition 
and functions counter-productively to public health protection. Media broadcasters 
are tempted to publish such information to scandalize and increase sales or to 
manipulate public opinion and instigate fears. Finally, the ruling also highlights the 
centrality of consent in health data processing. 
Th e next sections analyze the relevant aspects in the EU and Polish case-law 
concerning employment relations. Th ese cases demonstrate the breadth of human 
rights’ implications for individuals when their health data are transferred and/
or misused in the area of occupational medicine, the right to work and the right to 
access public service.
2.3. Lesson 2: Th e misuse of health data, occupational medicine and the right 
to work
Mr. X took part in a recruitment procedure at the European Commission57. 
During the process, a specifi c blood test was carried out by a medical offi  cer to 
establish indirectly his immune defi ciency (AIDS), because he had explicitly refused 
to undergo HIV-antibodies testing. Th e test was thus carried out and communicated 
to Mr. X’s general practitioner without his consent. As a result, Mr. X was denied 
employment due to “physical unfi tness”. 
While referring to Article 8 ECHR, the CJEU stated that the right to personal 
privacy includes keeping secret the state of one’s health. It also held that the legitimate 
interest of institutions in verifying the fi tness of future employees (general public 
interest) can be justifi ed as such, but medical tests cannot be performed against the 
person’s will. It precludes any test which could establish the existence of an illness 
concerned. An unconsented medical test infringes the very substance of the protected 
right and constitutes disproportionate and intolerable interference.58 
Th e second important case for consideration is that of Ms. F and concerned the 
transfer, without her consent and knowledge, of her medical fi le (containing personal 
health data) between EU institutions for the purposes of a recruitment process59. Th e 
CJEU referred to Article 8 ECHR again to scrutinize the lawfulness of the interference 
based on the legitimate aim of pre-recruitment medical examination and emphasized 
that exceptions must be constructed narrowly out of respect for the principle of 
57 Judgment of the Court of 5 October 1994 on the case of X v Commission of the European 
Communities, C-404/92 P.
58 Ibidem, points 1–8, 17–25. 
59 Judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of the 5 July 2011 on the case of V v. European Parliament, 
F-46/09, points 112–113.
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proportionality. Th e CJEU also cited the ECtHR’s restricted margin of appreciation 
applicable to “extremely intimate and sensitive nature of medical data”60.
While establishing the violation of the right, the CJEU stated that the right to 
privacy governs not only a patient’s privacy (relating to medical ethics), but also the 
confi dence (trust) in the medical profession and in the health services in general. 
It underlined that the sole institutional interest does not justify transfer of health 
data without consent, especially of those stored for another purpose (diff erent 
recruitment); and that the secret practice of inter-institutional transfer of health data 
was not acceptable61.
Finally in a national, Polish case, an inappropriate medical certifi cate and 
misconduct by the administrative personnel (who communicated the health data to 
the company chief) allowed the employer to learn about Mr. P.S.’s seropositive status. 
It resulted in his immediate dismissal without any grounds. Th e claim concerned 
damages, and, in 2019, the Polish Regional Court adjudicated high compensation 
based on discrimination in employment of the person concerned62. 
Th e cases show vividly the co-relation between the infringement upon privacy 
rights, the right to work and discrimination in access to employment by public 
and private actors. Discriminatory recruitment and redundancies resulting from 
disease stigma oft en occur because of unlawful health data transfer, fear among co-
employees, but also lack of medical knowledge and ignorance of the actual health 
condition of persons concerned63. Th e philosophy of automatic dismissal of those 
aff ected by a disease is unfortunately not limited to discriminatory treatment, but can 
also be provided by law. Th e next section depicts this issue.
2.4. Lesson 3: Th e use of health data and access to public service 
and employment
Th e Polish CT’s judgment (2009) concerned the provisions that regulated the 
fi tness of the candidates to the Polish police forces and the respective powers of 
medical committees64. Th e applicable law mandated an automatic classifi cation 
of seropositive persons serving in the police to the category of persons “entirely 
60 Ibidem, points 122–3, 131, referring to judgment of ECtHR of 25 February 1997 on the case of Z v 
Finland, application no. 22009/03.
61 Judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of the 5 July 2011 on the case of V v. European Parliament, 
F-46/09, points 128–140.
62 Judgment of the District Court in Warsaw of 14 May 2019, XXI Pa 106/19, http://www.ptpa.org.
pl/site/assets/fi les/1855/sygn__akt__xxi_pa_106_19.pdf (accessed 29.04.2021). 
63 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 2 October 2012, II PK 82/12, OSNP 2013, no. 17–18, item 
202; Judgment of ECtHR of 3 October 2013 on the case of I.B. v. Greece, application no. 552/10; 
Judgment of the EU Court of First Instance of 9 June 1994 on the case of X v. Commission, 
T-94/92.
64 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 23 November 2009, P 61/08, OTK 2009, no. 10A, item 
150.
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incapable of service” and automatic dismissal from work. Th ere was no exception to 
this rule and no possibility of its disapplication. 
Aft er an exemplary analysis of the proportionality of the restriction of the right 
to access public service (Articles 60 and 31(3) of the Constitution), the CT found that 
the objectives of ensuring the good health of police personnel and the public health 
protection from disease, which realize the state duty to combat epidemics under 
Article 68(4) of the Constitution, do not justify the automatism and restrictiveness 
of the legislative solution considered. Th e CT indicated that the law should aim to 
protect both public health and the right to access public service. It stated that the 
contested regulation infringed upon human dignity and led to a “mechanical” 
exclusion of HIV-infected persons despite the psychophysical conditions (service 
suitability), a state of health of an asymptomatic person, and circumstance of 
infection, which may be caused by the service itself, undertaken in the social interest. 
Th e CT also recognized that the relation between the HIV-status and the right to 
work/public service is an important social problem (disease stigma) and that the 
disproportionality of contested rules could be counterproductive and, in fact, lead to 
hiding infections and increased health threats. It supported its arguments by referring 
to the EU and US case-law and to the UN guidance on HIV and human rights, which 
recommend that no mandatory testing be conducted in recruitment processes, that 
the stability of employment be guaranteed as long as a person is able to work, and that 
the protection ensure against discrimination and stigmatization in the workplace.
Th e next case of Mr. P.T. concerns disclosure of his HIV-status in a certifi cate 
exempting him from military service, the presentation of which was obligatory upon 
renewing the identity documents and in job applications. Th e ECtHR held that there 
had been a violation of Article 8 ECHR, fi nding that the disclosure of seropositive 
status in the certifi cate concerned had breached the privacy rights. It noted that the 
Moldovan Government had not specifi ed which “legitimate aim” of limitation of 
Article 8 ECHR had been pursued by revealing the illness and including sensitive 
information about the applicant in the certifi cate, which could be requested in 
a variety of situations, and where the medical condition was of no relevance. Th e 
ECHR found that such a serious interference with the right was disproportionate65.
Th e judgments show that inadequately and disproportionately implemented 
public health protection from contagious diseases can easily lead to unnecessary 
breaches of health confi dentiality, the exclusion based on normative framework, and 
ultimately, discrimination based on health. Moreover, the fear of diseases and the 
temptation to exploit health data as a discriminating tool of exclusion and oppression 
appear also instructively in the histories of judicial proceedings where medical data 
65 Judgment of ECtHR of 26 May 2020 on the case of P.T. v. the Republic of Moldova, application 
no. 1122/12. See also judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 19 June 2018, SK 19/17, 
OTK-A 2018, item 42.
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were unnecessary disclosed during court trials with no connection to legal actions. 
Th ree cases illustrate the relevant matters.
2.5. Lesson 4: Th e disclosure of health data in judicial proceedings
In 1999, Mr. Panteleyenko faced criminal charges for alleged abuse of power and 
forgery of documents66. His offi  ce was searched as part of the investigation. During 
one of the proceedings, Mr. Panteleyenko denied having had mental health issues 
and produced a certifi cate from a psychiatric hospital supporting this assertion. Th e 
certifi cate was challenged, and the court requested his health records. As a result, 
his health record (explaining his treatment of mental illness) was provided by the 
hospital and read aloud at a public hearing.
Th e ECtHR found the violation of the applicant’s right to privacy (Article 8 
ECHR) due to the search of his offi  ce and the disclosure of his confi dential health 
data in court, which was beyond what was necessary for the proceedings, as the 
information was not “important for an inquiry, pre-trial investigation or trial”. Th e 
ECtHR explained that both the storing and use of information about an individual’s 
private life by a public authority constitutes an interference with Article 8. Moreover, 
the ECtHR noted that the details at issue were irrelevant for the outcome of the 
litigation (i.e., establishing whether the alleged statement was made and assessing 
whether it was libelous) and that the domestic court’s request for health information 
was redundant and unlawful according to the national law. Th is case highlights the 
problem of the disclosure and use of medical data that are ultimately irrelevant to 
a specifi c action. 
A similar issue arose in the context of divorce proceedings of Mr. L.L. during 
which national courts used documents from his medical records without consent 
and any appointed medical expert67. Th e ECtHR again established a violation of 
Article 8 ECHR fi nding that the interference with the applicant’s private life had not 
been justifi ed in view of the fundamental importance of protecting personal data. 
It observed that the French courts had referred to the impugned medical report on 
a subsidiary basis to support their decisions, and, apparently, they could have reached 
the same conclusion without it. 
Finally, in the case of Ms. Z, a Finnish national, the health data were included 
directly in the judgment68. Ms. Z and Mr. X (her husband) were both seropositive 
when X was convicted of rape. Ms. Z’s confi dential medical records disclosing 
her infection were seized by the prosecution and included in the investigation fi le 
without her prior consent. Th e City Court held the trial in camera and ordered the 
66 Judgment of ECtHR of 29 June 2006 on the case of Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, application no. 
11901/02. 
67 Judgment of ECtHR of 10 October 2006 on the case of L.L. v. France, application no. 7508/02.
68 Judgment of the ECtHR of 25 February 1997 on the case of Z. v. Finland, application no. 22009/93.
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ten-year confi dentiality period of the case fi le, but Ms. Z’s identity and health data 
(HIV-status) were published in the fi nal judgment. 
Th e ECtHR agreed that the seizure of the medical records in question and 
the orders requiring Ms. Z’s medical advisers to give evidence in proceedings did 
not constitute a violation of Article 8 ECHR. However, the ECtHR noted that the 
national court was informed by X’s lawyer about her confi dentiality wishes and the 
lack of consent to the disclosure of information. Further, the ECtHR did not fi nd any 
cogent reasons which would support the impugned publication of her health data 
in X’s criminal conviction (irrespective of whether she had expressly requested the 
Court of Appeal not to disclose her identity and medical condition). Accordingly, the 
ECtHR established that the publication of the information concerned constituted the 
violation of the right to respect for private life under Article 869.
Th e above discussed cases help to demonstrate that health data processing 
and unjustifi ed disclosure oft en take place against the individuals’ will and may 
have irreversible adverse consequences. Th is kind of disclosure can happen 
notwithstanding appropriate procedural safeguards. Th e privacy breach is even more 
disturbing then, because individuals concerned have confi dence that their rights will 
be respected.
Finally, discrimination based on health concerns both state citizens and 
foreigners. Th e ECtHR case-law shows the unequal treatment of migrants in the 
present context.
2.6. Lesson 5: Th e misuse of health data of and discrimination against 
migrants
Our last example concerns the Russian authorities’ refusal to grant a residence 
permit to an Uzbek national because of a seropositive test, in response to which 
the ECtHR strongly condemned the stigmatization of people living with HIV70. 
Mr. Kiyutin challenged the decision as disruptive of his right to enjoy family life 
and disproportionate to the legitimate aim of public health protection. Th e ECtHR 
stated that the extremely intimate and sensitive nature of the information related 
to HIV-status calls for the most careful judicial scrutiny of any action taken by 
states, especially to communicate or disclose such information without consent. 
While eventually accepting that the impugned measure pursued the legitimate 
aim of protecting public health, it nevertheless established a violation of Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination) in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR. It also explained 
that health experts and international bodies recommend that any travel restrictions 
69 See also A. Grzelak, Ochrona, op. cit., p. 111.
70 Judgment of ECtHR of 10 March 2011 on the case of Kiyutin v Russia, application no. 2700/10.
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for seropositive persons cannot be justifi ed by reference to public-health concerns71. 
In these migration cases, the ECtHR also acknowledged that the protection of 
personal data, including health information, is fundamentally important to the 
enjoyment of the right to respect for private life guaranteed by Article 8 and freedom 
from discrimination provided by Article 14 ECHR. 
In sum, respect for health data confi dentiality is a central aspect of personal 
privacy in the European human rights system and ought to constitute a vital principle 
in the legal systems of all members of the Council of Europe. It can be limited under 
the enumerated exceptions and strict conditions only72. 
Yet, the above-described jurisprudence also demonstrates that a high threshold 
of health data protection does not decrease the likelihood of disrespect of the existing 
protection guarantees and the resulting infringements of human rights. Th is legal-
historical analysis serves as a crucial warning of the high temptation of all actors who 
have access to misuse health data, because health belongs to the most valuable and 
intimate aspect of human personality. Th e use of digital tools also prompts additional 
risks for health privacy73. Epidemics of infectious diseases also cause societal fear, 
which increases the probability of discrimination and stigmatizing practice. In such 
circumstances, overreactions are likely regardless of established laws.74
For these reasons, the regulation and use of Covid-19 applications require a very 
careful scrutiny of human rights arguments, rule of law principles, and ethical values 
(public health ethics) to verify whether their development and use can be justifi ed 
in the aim of preventing disease spread (public health protection). We turn to these 
arguments in the next section.
3. Public Health Ethics and Covid-19 Digital Applications in Poland: 
Arguments Against
Th e analysis will now proceed to the examination of the regulation and 
exploitation of Covid-19 digital applications in the Polish context (section 2 above) 
71 Th e ECtHR repeated these fi ndings in the judgement of ECtHR of 15 March 2016 on the case 
of Novruk and others v. Russia, applications nos. 31039/11, 48511/11, 76810/12, 14618/13 and 
13817/14.
72 Judgment of ECtHR of 17 January 2012 on the case of Varapnickaitė-Mažylienė v. Lithuania, 
application no. 20376/05, § 44.
73 Cf. also W.K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and Medical Privacy, “Boston 
University Law Review” 2007, vol. 87, pp. 347–395, for the U.S. context.
74 See also W.K. Mariner, G.J. Annas and L.H. Glantz, Jacobson v Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-
Great-Grandfather’s Public Health Law, “American Journal of Public Health” 2005, vol. 95, Issue 
4, p. 587. Cf. C. McClain, Of Medicine, Race, and American law: Th e Bubonic Plague Outbreak of 
1900, “Law and Social Inquiry” 1988, no. 13, pp. 447–513.
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through the lens of public health ethics75. Th is lens prompts a closer look at the use 
of these applications from the standpoint of three angles: (i) the protection of human 
rights and other societal values; (ii) the respect for rule of law, including the focus on 
health and data protection laws; and (iii) the respect for some ethical principles. In 
this section, we present our arguments from these three perspectives and embedded 
in the current Polish reality.
3.1. Th e Human Rights-Based Arguments and Societal Values 
Let us begin by considering the use of applications in Covid-19 prevention in 
Poland in light of the requirements of human and constitutional rights protection 
and the related threats of infringements.
First, the case-law histories regarding infectious diseases (see section 3, above) 
indicate that health data can be easily used without consent, transferred to other, 
public and private third parties, or misused in employment, administrative and 
judicial proceedings. Health data in the present context are prone to infringements, 
because they are predominantly sensitive, since they concern the lives of individuals 
endangered by a contagion. Further, the societal fear of Covid-19 infection can be 
simply amplifi ed and lead to devastating social implications of discrimination and 
exclusion (e.g., children, migrants, and persons with disabilities). Th ese phenomena 
also oft en target societal groups, who are already vulnerable, discriminated and/or 
excluded. As a result, “grey zones” of entire groups avoiding healthcare are likely to 
occur and lead to the counter-eff ectiveness of the measures. 
Consequently, the protection of individual privacy and community public health 
interests requires recognition of two issues: (i) the vulnerability, caused by infection, 
of persons already experiencing a disease; and (ii) the devastating character of 
consequences of breaches of medical confi dentiality, including stigmatization and 
the exposition to “opprobrium and the risk of ostracism”76. Otherwise, measures 
claimed to protect public health can become tools of oppression, which are counter-
productive to public health protection77. It stems from the above-examined cases that 
courts oft en included the assessment of these issues in their proportionality analysis.
Second, respect for human (and constitutional) rights in the use of Covid-19 
applications arguably requires inclusion of three related aspects of state obligations: 
respect of individual rights (e.g., privacy), protection from harm from external sources 
and third parties (standards including necessity and proportionality conditions), and 
75 See fn. 15 above.
76 Th e ECtHR in cases Z v. Finland, op.cit., points 95–96; Biriuk v. Lithuania, op.cit, point 36; and 
Judgment of ECtHR of 6 October 2009 on the case of C. C. v. Spain, application no. 1425/06, point 
31.
77 W.E.  Parmet, Dangerous Perspectives. Th e Perils of Individualizing Public Health Problems, 
“Journal of Legal Medicine” 2009, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 83–108.
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fulfi lling the health needs of the population78. Th is means that any possible limitation 
of health data privacy in the use of digital applications must eff ectively ensure the 
high threshold of both constitutional and human rights protection standards (CFR 
and ECHR), including narrowly interpreted exceptions applied (from the national 
health law/GDPR) and the burden of proof justifying the usefulness of solutions in 
light of scientifi c and epidemiological evidence. In light of the analyzed judgments, 
it would require proving that data collected via Covid-19 applications actually help 
to reduce the spread of disease eff ectively; and, further, explaining if, why, and 
under what conditions, and on what legal basis, they will be used for other purposes 
(e.g., statistical and research purposes), especially as the latter does not necessarily 
contribute to the aim of public health protection from the disease.
Th ird, the protection of collective public health through the use of applications 
is not the sole value to be defended. Th e public health ethics approach requires 
a parallel protection of human dignity and human rights but also of the principles 
of equality and non-discrimination.79 Th e lack of adequate protection of any of these 
values aff ects individuals in all their circumstances, including family, social and 
employment situations. For example, the violation of health privacy can infl uence the 
freedom of movement and family reunion, the right to work (freedom of choice of 
one’s profession and place of work), the right to access public service, and other social 
security rights. Either the denial of employment or redundancy, based solely on an 
asymptomatic infection by contagious disease, is a frequent consequence of an access 
to personal medical data by an employer, leading to discrimination (and stigma) in 
the work environment. 
Forth, “public health” is oft en employed as a “label” for measures the actual 
objectives of which are diff erent and endanger human rights and privacy. It 
concerns, for example, state surveillance of health data for security reasons and/
or unknown reasons, including storing of data for an unspecifi ed time. Th e use of 
security phrasing in the context of health (“war to fi ght Covid-19”) helps to justify 
such measures.80 Th at is why the access by applications to individual health data may 
provide powerful and easy tools of manipulation of the freedoms of expression and 
of the press. It can also allow for the politicization of threats/risk assessments, which 
means using societal fear of the Covid-19 threat to govern, justify disproportionate 
restrictions of individual rights, and exercise political control over individuals by 
78 Cf. G.J. Annas, W. K. Mariner, (Public) Health and Human Rights, op. cit, pp. 132–135.
79 See also M. Domańska, People with Disabilities as a Vulnerable Group. Th e Concept of Protection 
of the Rights of Vulnerable Groups, “Białostockie Studia Prawnicze” 2018, Vol. 4, no. 23, 
pp. 25–34. 
80 See C.  O’Manique and P.  Fourie, Security and Health in the Twenty-First Century (in:) 
M.D. Cavelty and V. Maure (eds.), Th e Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, Abingdon/New 
York 2010. Cf. also A Lakoff , Two Regimes of Global Health, “Humanity” 2010, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 
59–79.
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portraying them as societal dangers81. An “accidental” broadcasting by the state TV 
of the Covid-19-test information of a leader of public protests against restrictions of 
reproductive rights in Poland off ers a recent relevant example82. Th e Polish CHR has 
initiated courts’ review of the case83. Hence, any health data stored through Covid-19 
applications could possibly be misused, in a similar way, as indirectly indicated by the 
case-law histories.
Finally, a state is obliged to ensure health data protection in both horizontal 
and vertical relations84. Th e access to users’ data by private providers of applications’ 
protocols (Google and Apple) create risk to health privacy, which is impossible to 
assess at the moment. However, it may suggest that the cost of infrastructure for 
data protection which would be required to exclude any such possibility questions 
the very rationality of the investment and development of such digital systems. Th e 
related arguments return in the next section.
3.2. Th e Rule of Law Arguments
Th e consideration of the use of Covid-19 applications in light of the modern 
and dynamic concept of the rule of law85 prompts the following observations. Th ey 
indicate that the development and use of Covid-19 applications might not meet some 
of the required conditions.
Th e rule of law requires the limitation of any arbitrary political power, assurance 
of legal certainty and predictability, and protection of individual and collective 
human rights from arbitrary actions of public authorities. It also demands that the 
legal system guarantee a set of standards (mandatory elements): generality, clarity 
and publicity of norms, no retrospective eff ect, feasibility, stability, consistency and 
compliance with the principle of proportionality86. When applying these standards to 
Covid-19 applications in Poland, several signifi cant problems can be identifi ed.
81 W.E.Parmet, Dangerous Perspectives, op. cit. 
82 Marta Lempart on leading Poland’s abortion rights protests, ‘Financial Times’, 02.12.2020, https://
www.ft .com/content/b6012449–0c11–419a-b439–6e3320f47e86 (accessed 29.04.2021).
83 Disclosure of the test for SARS-CoV–2 by Marta Lempart – complaint of the Polish Ombudsman 
to the Provincial Administrative Court, 18.2.2021, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/sprawa-
ujawnienia-przez-panstwo-testu-na-sars-cov-2-marty-lempart-skarga-rpo-do-wsa (accessed 
29.04.2021).
84 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 19 February 2002, U 3/01, OTK 2002 no. 1A, item 3, 
para. 1 in fi ne.
85 See recently: T. Drinóczi and A. Bień-Kacała (eds.), Rule of Law, Common Values, and Illiberal 
Constitutionalism. Poland and Hungary within the European Union, Abingdon/New York 
2020; among the vast literature on the topic; and also W.K. Mariner, G.J. Annas and W. Parmet, 
Pandemic Preparedness; A Return to the Rule of Law, “Drexel Law Review” 2009, vol. 1, no. 2, 
pp. 341–382.
86 As there is no opportunity to explain the concept of the rule of law here, one should refer to the 
documents of international organizations, including the Council of Europe, (2011), Th e Rule Of 
Law, adopted by the Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2011)003rev) or the European Commission, 
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Firstly, the laws establishing Covid-19 applications are not embedded in the 
Polish health law system in a coherent way. Both applications STOP COVID – 
ProteGO Safe and Kwarantanna domowa were based on emergency laws enacted in 
response to the pandemic, which aff ected their quality, predictability and certainty 
(see section 2, above). 
Moreover, the scrutiny of the Polish applications in use during the pandemic 
against the requirements of the GDPR general principles deepens the doubts. 
Michałowicz claims that the terms and conditions of use of the Kwarantanna domowa 
application and the privacy policy of the ProteGO Safe application are equally not free 
from textual errors and inconsistencies. Th ey either omit some information required 
by law or contain contradictory information. For example, these documents indicate 
that the user may exercise the right to object to the processing of personal data 
pursuant to Article 21 GDPR, but the exercise of this right is not applicable, because 
data processing is not based on an appropriate legal basis (arguably, it would need to 
be Article 6(1), letters e) and f) GDPR)87. It can thus be claimed that, because of the 
health data’s sensitive character and the purpose of the applications, data processing 
in both Covid-19 applications should include a reference to the GDPR’s two specifi c 
legal bases: Article 6(1), letters e) and f) 88 and Article 9(1), letter i) jointly89. Th e next 
question also arises whether the implementation of the transparency principle – as 
required by the GDPR – is adequate (Article 5(1), letter a) GDPR).
In summary, the doubts regarding the assessment of Covid-19 applications 
in light of the GDPR requirements regard data collection’s legal basis and purpose 
(unclear, predetermined purpose for collection; it should be limited to the aim 
of “protecting against serious cross-border threats to health”90); data collection 
(2014) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 
A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law (COM(2014) 158 fi nal), as well as the 
relevant jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (including recent cases C-619/18 Commission v. 
Poland or joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 A.K.). 
87 A. Michałowicz, Stosowanie, op. cit., p. 37.
88 Article 6(1) letter e) refers to the legal requirement – situation when processing is necessary for 
the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of offi  cial authority 
vested in the controller. Article 6(1) letter f) refers to a legitimate interest – situation when 
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or 
by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the data subject, which require protection of personal data, in particular where 
the data subject is a child.
89 Article 9(1) letter i) refers to the situation when processing is necessary for reasons of public 
interest in the area of public health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats to 
health or ensuring high standards of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal products 
or medical devices, on the basis of Union or Member State law, which provides for suitable 
and specifi c measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular 
professional secrecy.
90 Cf. Art. 9, Section 1, letter i, GDPR.
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scope (some collected data are redundant and unnecessary to achieve the goal set 
for a specifi c tool); data collection outcomes (a number of entities authorized to 
access the data whose activities are not related to the pursued goal); personal data 
retention time in Kwarantanna domowa (the six-year period of data storing since the 
application’s deactivation, hardly justifi able as a time-limit for civil claims91) and in 
ProteGO (imprecise period of data storing, its privacy policy indicates that data will 
be “stored no longer than the use of ProteGO Safe, and not longer than required by law 
and no longer than necessary to achieve the purpose of processing”92). 
Th ere is also some disparity between the applications’ technical design (which 
was assessed positively for ProteGO) and their practical functioning. Th eoretically, 
applications cannot collect the geolocation or physical proximity data of the user (via 
Bluetooth) when the user chooses information and symptom verifi cation functions 
only, but the contact-tracing function remains available. Yet, Michałowicz argues that 
the website, from which ProteGO can be downloaded, requires detailed permissions, 
including access to device location, Bluetooth settings, and network connections. 
Th is indicates that the actual scope of personal data processed in the application may 
actually be wider than the one declared in the privacy policy93.
Secondly, the lack of a truly independent control over the system of data 
processing in case of Covid-19 applications causes concerns. Th e data transfer to an 
external server (e.g., managed by the Polish Sanitary Inspectorate) can take place 
only in strictly defi ned and justifi ed cases (e.g., a confi rmed incident of infection). 
Yet, it cannot be excluded that the Covid-19 applications will lead to the creation 
of new databases stored on public administration servers or that the applicable 
law will be modifi ed to change the destination of the already collected data. Such 
processes are not impossible because they would be in accordance with, for example, 
the privacy policy of the ProteGO Safe application. It thus seems in this context that 
the GDPR-based control by the relevant Polish authority (President of the Personal 
Data Protection Offi  ce) is not suffi  cient to meet the relevant ECHR standards on the 
control of access to data by certain governmental services94. 
Th is is arguable, especially in light of the past experience with the actions of 
public authorities in Poland. Th ere were some alerting signals before the pandemic 
91 A. Michałowicz, Stosowanie, op. cit., p. 40.
92 § 3 pkt 10 ProteGO SafePrivacy Policy, https://www.gov.pl/attachment/092a389f-0a09–438f-
9532-b04b8c205c7e (accessed 29.4.2021).
93 A. Michałowicz, Stosowanie, op.cit., s. 39. 
94 Cf. Judgment of ECtHR of 23 July 2009 on the case of Hachette Filipacchi Associates v. France, 
application No. 12268/03, where the ECtHR aff orded a margin of appreciation to the state 
requiring adequate protection to individuals against the arbitrariness of the authorities by 
ensuring judicial control or other independent control system of measures interfering with the 
rights of an individual (see also Judgment of ECtHR of 7 March 2017 on the case of Polyakova and 
Others v. Russia, applications Nos 35090/09 et al.
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that some serious shortcomings in the data processing systems in Poland already 
existed95. Th e fact that the government demonstrated openness to the societal control 
during the development of the ProteGO Safe application96, but not with the second 
one (Kwarantanna domowa), may exactly indicate the change of approach. 
Th e problem with the legal basis for the transfer of data by state authorities 
has also emerged in several specifi c situations. For example, in Poland in 2020, 
presidential elections were to be organized by postal ballots because of the pandemic. 
Despite the lack of legal acts regulating it, the Minister of Digital Aff airs decided 
to transfer to Poczta Polska (the Polish Post, which was potentially responsible for 
sending election packages) the data of all citizens entitled to vote. Th e unlawfulness 
of the data transfer was confi rmed by the Provincial Administrative Court97. Second, 
the governmental actions of pandemic management, based on the Prime Minister’s 
orders solely98 and the adoption of normative acts of a sub-statutory rank in place of 
law statutes99, did not help to overcome the distrust of the digital measures. Given 
the doubts surrounding the applications against the GDPR requirements outlined 
above, it is therefore hard to trust and ascertain that the data collected via Covid-19 
applications will be used solely for the purposes declared by the authorities.
Lastly, the requirement for the social acceptance of norms belongs to the rule 
of law conceptualization100. Th us, the consideration of three facts is needed in the 
present context: the high polarization of the Polish society; the overwhelming lack of 
trust in the government; and the conviction of part of the society that the authorities 
are moving towards an authoritarian regime101. It is not our goal to determine 
their actuality and extent, but such social beliefs may result in a very low level of 
acceptance of any solutions that rely on gathering information about society, which 
95 Expert team of the Polish CHR, “Osiodłać pegaza” report, September 2019, https://www.rpo.gov.
pl/pl/content/osodlac-pegaza-inwigilacja-propozycja-niezalezna-instytucje-do-nadzoru-sluzb-
specjalnych (accessed 29.4.2021).
96 Report from the audits of the ProteGO Safe, https://www.gov.pl/web/protegosafe/audyt-
bezpieczenstwa--zobacz-raport (accessed 29.4.2021). Th ere is no such report in relation to 
“Kwarantanna domowa”.
97 Judgment of the Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw of 26 February 2021, IV SA / Wa 
1817/20, Lex no. 3150569.
98 Koronawrius. Czy premier nakazał telekomom przekazywanie danych lokalizacyjnych osób 
chorych i w kwarantannie, 17.4.2020, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/koronawrius-rpo-
czy-premier-nakazal-przekazywanie-danych-lokalizacyjnych or Do rządu popłynął strumień 
danych o lokalizacji osób poddanych kwarantannie, 16.4.2020, https://www.rp.pl/Koronawirus-
SARS-CoV–2/200419545-Do-rzadu-poplynal-strumien-danych-o-lokalizacji-osob-poddanych-
kwarantannie.html (accessed 29.4.2021).
99 For example, the law ordering the wearing of masks was adopted only on October 28, 2020, prior 
to which this obligation resulted from the provisions of the Regulation of the Council of Ministers 
only. 
100 See note 82 above.
101 W. Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown, Oxford 2019.
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clearly aff ects the utility of any such tools. Th is brings us to the ethical arguments 
against the applications.
3.3. Th e Ethical Arguments 
Finally, refl ecting on the ethical principles and the use of Covid-19 applications 
provokes several remarks. 
Th e ethical scholarship usually emphasizes that the following principles need to 
be respected in the use of digital applications in response to the Covid-19 pandemic: 
autonomy, utility, voluntarism, and equality. Th e principle of autonomy requires 
prioritization of individual consent and the citizens’ fi rst approach in data protection. 
In light of the preceding analysis, it is not convincing that both Covid-19 applications 
respect these principles. Although, theoretically, all grounds of processing personal 
data are equal, this does not mean that they can be used freely, since diff erent 
consequences are linked to various legal bases102. Imposing a legal basis in the form 
of a legal obligation would be an expression of the authority and would ignore the 
ethical aspect and the necessity to take into account the citizens’ fi rst approach. In 
this sense, consent should be a priority for data processing in situations such as those 
discussed in this text. 
Next, the Polish applications can also be questioned from the perspective of 
the utility principle given the very low number of participants in the ProteGO Safe 
application, while, in case of Kwarantanna domowa, the relevant data are unknown 
(see section 2, above). Th e utility of the tools is doubtful, because usually at least 
a sixty percent uptake is needed for their eff ectiveness. Th us, the public usage of 
mobile applications depends not only on the perfection of technical solutions used 
in the development of such applications (or potential compatibility of measures with 
the human rights and constitutional standards, for that matter), but also on the level 
of social trust and acceptance of far-reaching digitalization to reduce the pandemic 
(refl ected in the number of people using a specifi c application). 
In addition, the Kwarantanna domowa application has not respected the ethical 
principle of voluntarism entirely. It seems to follow a paternalistic approach in heath 
law, which should instigate a broader debate that links (public health) ethics and law. 
Otherwise, the risk of an uncritical acceptance of solutions unjustifi ably limiting 
individual rights increases. 
Finally, although the vast majority of the population owns a smartphone, the 
actual realization of the equal access principle can be questioned. Many persons can 
encounter the problems with inadequate operation systems on their phones, which 
do not allow for the applications to be downloaded or encounter diffi  culties handling 
them (the elderly, people with disabilities). 
102 W. Kotschy, Comment on Article 6, in: Ch. Kuner, L. A. Bygrave and Ch. Docksey (eds.), Th e EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). A commentary, Oxford 2020, p. 339. 
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To sum up, in light of the three perspectives applied in this section to examine 
the design, use and regulation of Covid-19 applications in Poland, it is diffi  cult to 
conclude that their regulation and use meet fully the requirements of public health 
ethics based on the protection of human rights, the respect for the rule of law and 
ethical principles.
Conclusions
Th is article scrutinizes the normative framework and use of Covid-19 digital 
applications in Poland and arrives at the conclusion that the implementation of 
these solutions has not been suffi  ciently justifi ed. To determine this conclusion, 
we analytically examine the technical and legal features of the applications; explore 
the case-law history concerning the potential confl ict between the protection of the 
right to health privacy and public health with the implications for diverse human/
constitutional rights; and inspect the applications against the human rights-based 
standards, ethical principles and the rule of law arguments (the conceptualization of 
the public health ethics). Th e article questions the use of these digital tools as such 
amidst the doubts surrounding them, and, therefore, departs from the approach 
employed by many existent scholarly works off ering analyses of lawful usage of public 
health surveillance technologies, including coronavirus applications, but usually not 
questioning the developed solutions103.
It needs to be emphasized strongly that we do not question the necessity of 
contact-tracing measures employed by public health authorities during health 
emergencies/pandemics to identify sources of contagion, inform people about 
their possible exposure to infection, and impose quarantines to limit the spread 
of diseases and protect populations’ health. Th e employment of the public health 
measures can then lead to limiting human/constitutional rights on the condition 
that at minimum they are lawful and proportionate. However, aft er scrutinizing the 
Covid-19 applications in the present text, we see no suffi  cient safeguards that promise 
that these conditions will be always fulfi lled and individual human rights and data 
protection will be respected; that third parties will not misuse the data; that the 
government will actually fulfi l its obligations to ensure that no violations occur; or 
that ethical principles will be followed. Accordingly, we argue that the digital methods 
employed to achieve public health goals must always be examined very carefully, 
because their justifi cation in terms of a useful prevention of disease spread can likely 
be unsatisfactory.104 
103 Cf. S. Sekalala, S. Dagron, L. Forman and B.M. Meier, Analyzing the Human Rights Impact of 
Increased Digital Public Health Surveillance during the COVID-19 Crisis, “Health and Human 
Rights Journal” 2020, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 7–20.
104 Cf. W.K. Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection, op. cit., p. 1052.
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We also think that the purely legal standpoint and analyses are not suffi  cient 
to adequately assess the justifi cation of digital applications used for public health 
purposes. Th at is why, the application of the critical lens of public health ethics is 
helpful. It allows for the presentation of a broader picture from the wide-ranging 
perspectives and the development of a complete and coherent argument around the 
use of these applications in response to pandemics. In light of the applied lens, our 
extensive analysis of the Covid-19 applications developed in Poland prompts the 
recommendation that there is no convincing justifi cation for their use in the present 
circumstances. 
Th e number of actual threats to the protection of individual rights, including the 
health privacy, legal reservations and ethical doubts highlighting societal resistance, 
which de facto cannot be feasibly eliminated, do not convincingly outweigh any 
potential benefi t from the use of the applications, at least in light of the analyzed 
examples. Finally, digital tools can be developed for public health protection, but the 
key question must always be asked critically: what is their justifi cation?
REFERENCES
Alston P., Does the past matter? On the origins of human rights, “Harvard Law Review” 2013, vol. 126, 
no. 7.
Annas G.J. and Mariner W.K., (Public) Health and Human Rights in Practice, “Journal of Health Politics, 
Policy and Law” 2016, vol. 41, no. 1.
Annas G.J., Worst Case Bioethics, Oxford/New York 2011.
Aplikacja „Kwarantanna domowa” budzi wątpliwości obywateli. Rzecznik pisze do premiera, 13.11.2020, 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-do-premiera-aplikacja-kwarantanna-domowa-budzi-
watpliwosci.
Bradford L. Aboy M. and Liddell K., COVID-19 contact tracing apps: a stress test for privacy, the GDPR, 
and data protection regimes, “Journal of Law and the Biosciences” 2020, vol. 7, no. 1.
Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz K. and Nowikowska M., Bezpieczeństwo, tożsamość, prywatność – aspekty 
prawne, Warsaw 2020.
Commission Implementing Decision amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/253 as regards alerts 
triggered by serious cross-border threats to health and for the contact tracing of passengers 
identifi ed through Passenger Locator Forms, 25.03.2021, no ref. yet.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A new EU 
Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law (COM(2014) 158 fi nal).
Coronavirus contact tracing reignites Polish privacy debate, “Deutsche Welle”, https://www.dw.com/en/
coronavirus-contact-tracing-reignites-polish-privacy-debate/a-53600913.
Coronavirus Pandemic In Th e EU – Fundamental Rights Implications: With A Focus On Contact-




Patrycja Dąbrowska-Kłosińska, Agnieszka Grzelak and Agnieszka Nimark
Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
Dąbrowska-Kłosińska P., Stosowanie unijnych przepisów o transgranicznych zagrożeniach dla zdrowia, 
a ochrona danych osobowych w UE, „Przegląd Prawa i Administracji Acta Universitatis 
Wratislaviensis” 2016, vol. 107. 
Dąbrowska-Kłosińska P., Tracing Individuals under the EU Regime on Serious, Cross-border Health 
Th reats: An Appraisal of the System of Personal Data Protection, ‘European Journal of Risk 
Regulation’ 2017, vol. 8, no. 4.
De Hert P.  and Gutwirth S., Data Protection in the Case Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action, (in:) S. Gutwirth, Y. Poullet, P. De Hert, C. de Terwangne and 
S. Nouwt (eds.), Reinventing Data Protection?, Dordrecht 2009.
Deloitte, Privacy and Data Protection in the age of COVID-19, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/
Deloitte/be/ Documents/risk/be-risk_privacy-and-data-protection-in-the-age-of-covid-19.pdf.
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal off ences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (O.J. L 119, 4.5.2016).
Disclosure of the test for SARS-CoV–2 by Marta Lempart – complaint of the Polish Ombudsman to 
the Provincial Administrative Court, 18 February 2021, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/
sprawa-ujawnienia-przez-panstwo-testu-na-sars-cov-2-marty-lempart-skarga-rpo-do-wsa.
Do rządu popłynął strumień danych o lokalizacji osób poddanych kwarantannie, 16.4.2020, https://
www.rp.pl/Koronawirus-SARS-CoV–2/200419545-Do-rzadu-poplynal-strumien-danych-o-
lokalizacji-osob-poddanych-kwarantannie.html.
Domańska M., People with Disabilities as a Vulnerable Group. Th e Concept of Protection of the Rights 
of Vulnerable Groups, “Białostockie Studia Prawnicze” 2018, vol. 4, no. 23. 
Drinóczi T., Bień-Kacała A.  (eds.), Rule of Law, Common Values, and Illiberal Constitutionalism. 
Poland and Hungarywithin the European Union, Abingdon/New York 2020.
eHealth Network, Mobile applications to support contact tracing in the EU’s fi ght against COVID-19, 
Common EU Toolbox for Member States, https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/fi les/ehealth/
docs/covid-19_apps_en.pdf.
European Commission, Communication from the Commission Guidance on Apps supporting the 
fi ght against COVID 19 pandemic in relation to data protection, 2020/C 124 I/01, C/2020/2523 
(O.J. C 124I, 17.4.2020).
European Data Protection Board (EDPB), Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contact 
tracing tools in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, 21.4.2020, https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/
edpb/fi les/fi les/fi le1/edpb_guidelines_20200420_contact_tracing_covid_with_annex_en.pdf.
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), EU Digital Solidarity: a call for a pan-European approach 
against the pandemic, 06.4.2020, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/fi les/publication/2020–04-06
_eu_digital_solidarity_covid19_en.pdf.




The Use of Covid-19 Digital Apps and Unavoidable Threats to Protection of Health Data and Privacy
Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
Florczak-Wątor M., Komentarz do art. 51 Konstytucji, (in:) P. Tuleja (ed.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej. Komentarz, Warsaw 2020. 
FRA and Council for Europe, Handbook on European Data Protection Law, Luxembourg 2018.
Fundamental Rights Agency, Coronavirus Pandemic in the EU – fundamental rights implications: 
with a focus on contact-tracing apps, https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/fi les/fra_uploads/
fra-2020-coronavirus-pandemic-eu-bulletin-may_en.pdf.
Garlicki L. and Zubik M. (eds.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, Tom I, Warsaw 2016.
Grzelak A. (ed.), Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych przetwarzanych w związku z zapobieganiem 
i zwalczaniem przestępczości, Warsaw 2019.
Grzelak A., Ochrona danych osobowych we współpracy państw członkowskich UE w zwalczaniu 
przestępczości, Warsaw 2015.
Jackowski M., Ochrona danych medycznych, Warsaw 2011.
Joined statement on the right to data protection in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic by A. Pierucci 
and J.-P. Walter, 30.3.2020 https://rm.coe.int/covid19-joint-statement/16809e09f4. 
Kędzior M., Th e right to data protection and the COVID-19 pandemic: the European approach, ‘ERA 
Forum’ 2021, no. 21.
Koronawrius. Czy premier nakazał telekomom przekazywanie danych lokalizacyjnych osób chorych 
i w kwarantannie, 17.4.2020, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/koronawrius-rpo-czy-premier
-nakazal-przekazywanie-danych-lokalizacyjnych.
Koschalka B., Uptake of Covid contact tracing app under 2% in Poland, among the lowest rates 
in Europe, 11.9.2020, https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/09/11/uptake-of-covid-contact
-tracing-app-under-2-in-poland-among-the-lowest-rates-in-europe.
Kotschy W., Comment on Article 6, (in:) Ch. Kuner, L.A.  Bygrave and Ch. Docksey (eds.), Th e EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). A commentary, Oxford 2020.
Kusat Kaya E., Safety and privacy in the time of covid-19: contact tracing applications, https://www.jstor.
org/stable/resrep26089?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
Lakoff  A., Two Regimes of Global Health, “Humanity” 2010, vol. 1, no. 1.
Łakomiec K., Konstytucyjna ochrona prywatności. Dane dotyczące zdrowia, Warsaw 2020.
Lucivero F., Hallowell N., Johnson S., Prainsack B., Samuel G. and Sharon T., COVID-19 and Contact 
Tracing Apps: Ethical Challenges for a Social Experiment on a Global Scale, “Journal of 
Bioethical Inquiry” 2020, no. 17.
Mariner W.K., Annas G.J.  and Glantz L.H., Jacobson v Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-Great-
Grandfather’s Public Health Law, “American Journal of Public Health” 2005, vol. 95, Issue 4. 
Mariner W.K., Annas G.J. and Parmet W., Pandemic Preparedness; A Return to the Rule of Law, “Drexel 
Law Review” 2009, vol. 1, no. 2.
Mariner W.K., Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and Medical Privacy, “Boston University Law 
Review” 2007, vol. 87.
Mariner W.K., Reconsidering Constitutional Protection for Health Information Privacy, “Journal of 
Constitutional Law” 2016, vol. 18, no. 3.
92
Patrycja Dąbrowska-Kłosińska, Agnieszka Grzelak and Agnieszka Nimark
Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
Marta Lempart on leading Poland’s abortion rights protests, “Financial Times”, 02.12.2020, https://www.
ft .com/content/b6012449–0c11–419a-b439–6e3320f47e86.
MC zapewnia: aplikacja mobilna „Kwarantanna Domowa” - zgodna z wymogami RODO, 30.11.2020, 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/mc-zapewnia-rpo-aplikacja-kwarantanna-domowa-
zgodna-z-rodo.
McClain C., Of Medicine, Race, and American law: Th e Bubonic Plague Outbreak of 1900, “Law and 
Social Inquiry” 1988, no. 13.
Michałowicz A., Stosowanie aplikacji mobilnych podczas pandemii COVID-19 z perspektywy ochrony 
danych osobowych, „Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2020, no. 6.
Murphy T., Health and Human Rights’ Past: Patinating Law’s Contribution, “Health and Human Rights 
Journal” 21 November 2019.
Norwegian Infection Stop, https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3675/theres-app-coronavirus
-apps.
O’Manique C. and Fourie P., Security and Health in the Twenty-First Century (in:) M.D. Cavelty and 
V. Maure (eds.), Th e Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, Abingdon/New York 2010.
O’Neill P.H., Ryan-Mosley T. and Johnson B., A fl ood of coronavirus apps are tracking us. Now it’s time 
to keep track of them, “MIT Technology Review”, 7 May 2020, https://www.technologyreview.
com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittr-covid-tracing-tracker.
Obem A., ProteGO Safe: instalować czy nie?, 3.8.2020, https://panoptykon.org/czy-instalowac-
protego-safe.
OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), Ensuring data privacy as we battle 
COVID-19, 14.4.2020 http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/ensuring-data-
privacy-as-we-battle-covid-19–36c2f31e/#section-d1e690.
Pagliari C., Th e ethics and value of contact tracing apps: International insights and implications for 
Scotland’s COVID-19 response, “Journal of Global Health” 2020, vol. 10.
Parmet W.E., Dangerous Perspectives. Th e Perils of Individualizing Public Health Problems, “Journal of 
Legal Medicine” 2009, vol. 30, no. 1.
Privacy leaders, https://iapp.org/resources/article/privacy-leaders-views-impact-of-covid19-on-privacy
-priorities-practices-programs. 
Protection of health-related data – Recommendation CM/Rec(2019)2 adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, 27.3.2019.
Ram N. and Gray D., Mass surveillance in the age of COVID-19, “Journal of Law and the Biosciences” 
2020, vol. 7, no. 1.
Regulation (EU) No. 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (O.J. L 119, 4.5.2016).
Report from the audits of the ProteGO Safe, https://www.gov.pl/web/protegosafe/audyt-
bezpieczenstwa--zobacz-raport.
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Th e right to privacy in the digital 
age, 3.8.2018, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DigitalAge/Pages/ReportDigitalAge.aspx.
93
The Use of Covid-19 Digital Apps and Unavoidable Threats to Protection of Health Data and Privacy
Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
Report on the rule of law - Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 86th plenary session, Venice, 25–26 
March 2011.
Roberts S.L., Big Data, Algorithmic Governmentality and the Regulation of Pandemic Risk, “European 
Journal of Risk Regulation” 2019, vol. 10, Issue 1.
Rojszczak M., Nieograniczone programy inwigilacji elektronicznej a koncepcja państwa autorytarnego, 
„Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis - Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem” 2020, vol. 
42, no. 2.
Rojszczak M., Ochrona prywatności w cyberprzestrzeni z uwzględnieniem zagrożeń wynikających 
z nowych technik przetwarzania informacji, Warsaw 2019.
Sadurski W., Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown, Oxford 2019.
Safj an M., Bosek L. (eds.), Instytucje Prawa Medycznego. System Prawa Medycznego. Tom 1, Warsaw 
2017.
Safj an M., Bosek L. (eds.), Konstytucja RP. Tom I. Komentarz do art. 1–86, Warsaw 2016.
Sekala S., Dagron S., Forman L., and Meier B.M., Analyzing the Human Rights Impact of Increased 
Digital Public Health Surveillance during the COVID-19 Crisis, “Health and Human Rights 
Journal” 2020, vol. 22, no. 2.
Sroka T., Ograniczenia praw i wolności konstytucyjnych oraz praw pacjenta w związku z wystąpieniem 
zagrożenia epidemicznego, „Palestra” 2020, no. 6.
Świtała K., Interoperacyjność i bezpieczeństwo danych medycznych w systemach e-zdrowia 
i telemedycynie, (in:) I.  Lipowicz, M.  Świerczyński and G.  Szpor (eds.), Telemedycyna 
i e-Zdrowie. Prawo i informatyka, Warsaw 2019.
Th eme 3: Covid-19, privacy rights and cyber security risks, ‘Covid-19 Resources’, Pinciples for 
Responsible Investment, 7.9.2020, https://www.unpri.org/covid-19-resources/theme-3-covid-
19-privacy-rights-and-cyber-security-risks/6343.article.
Th ere’s an app for that: Coronavirus apps, 20.4.2020, https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3675/
theres-app-coronavirus-apps.
Tracking and tracing COVID: Protecting privacy and data while using apps and biometrics, 23.4.2020, 
OECD, https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/tracking-and-tracing-covid-
protecting-privacy-and-data-while-using-apps-and-biometrics-8f394636.
Tuleja P., Komentarz do art. 31 Konstytucji RP, (in:) P.  Tuleja (ed.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej. Komentarz, Warsaw 2020. 
Van Kolfschooten H.  and de Ruijter A., COVID-19 and privacy in the European Union: A legal 
perspective on contact tracing, “Contemporary Security Policy” 2020, vol. 41, Issue 3.
Van Zeben J. and Kamphorst B.A., Tracking and Nudging through Smartphone Apps: Public Health and 
Decisional Privacy in a European Health Union, “European Journal of Risk Regulation” 2020, 
vol. 11, Issue 4.
Wałachowska M., Ochrona danych osobowych w prawie cywilnym i medycznym, Toruń 2008.
Wiewiórowski W.R., Profi lowanie osób na podstawie ogólnodostępnych danych, (in:) A. Mednis (ed.), 
Prywatność a ekonomia: ochrona danych osobowych w obrocie gospodarczym, Warsaw 2013.
94
Patrycja Dąbrowska-Kłosińska, Agnieszka Grzelak and Agnieszka Nimark
Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
Wiewiórowski W.R., Rola Unii Europejskiej w koordynacji zastosowania narzędzi informatycznych do 
walki z pandemią, „Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2020, no. 6.
